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I. INTRODUCTION
Overlay mrdricust refers to the construction of a multicast tree at the application layer from a data source to multiple receivers. and it enjoys the attractive advantage that the application layer offers unprecedented flexibility and freedom to design new algorithms. Unfortunately, such freedom does not come without challenges: each overlay node is now a sepsh and strutepic end host, rather than an obedient router, and cooperative behavior between nodes can no longer be assumed. This means that each node will choose its actions that maximizes its private utility, and may be reluctant to replicate and forward messages to downstream children, since forwarding messages to downstream nodes incurs costs.
In this paper. our most important contribution is to apply the theory of nzechaaism design to the overlay multicast problem, and to design a strategyproof mechanism (to be precisely defined in Sec. IT) for all multicast siibscriberJ to forward messages downstream, while achieving a globally optimal overlay topoiogy in terms of maximum system throughput and minimum forwarding costs. Our solution is based on the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [ 1 ] from microeconomics. In essence, our solution quan tifm the (positive or negative) effects of each node's action IO the resr of fhe network. This effect. termed exremalily, must be calculated by the truthful revelation of private information by each node to the public. Once the externality is quantified, each node can take the optima1 action and join to the node on the existing multicast tree that will result in the maximum system-wide valuarion.
Our objective in this paper is to design prucricd and distributed algorithms based on insights from the theory of mechanism design. In practice, an overlay multicast session may support applications with diverse Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements. For dela!:-sefisifive applications such as multimedia streaming, it is not permitted to buffer data an intermediate relay nodes in the overlay multicast tree, which has been the implicit assumptions of most of the tree construction algorithms. On the other hand, €or delay-insensirive applications, the intermediate nodes may take advantage of its secondary storage to implement aggressive buffering, even to cache the entire data stream, Such extensive buffering significantly improves throughput at the costs of delay, since peers may exchange missing elements of data at their COR- venience. This has been the assumption of mesh construction algorithms such as Digital Fountain 121 or Bullet [3] . We seek to design strategyproof algorithms for overlay multicast tree construction in both of these cases, referred to as the scenario of single rate sessions and variable rate sessium, respectively.
We have successfully applied our theoretical results LO the design of a set of distributed algorithms and a working protocol implementation. Through careful and extensive experiments on PlanetLab [4] , we have evaluated the correctness, performance, and efficiency of our protocol. Results have shown that our distributed protocol not only converges to the correct solution, but also significantly increases the system throughput in both the variable and single rate scenarios. The message overhead of our protocol is also explored in our experimental studies, The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II first introduces some background information on the VCG mechanism. Sec. I11 defines our notations and network model, and formalizes our problem statement. In Sec. IV, we present our theoretical solution, distributed algorithms and protocol implementation of the variable rate scenario, followed by a discussion on the experimental results. Sec. V runs in parallel to Sec. IV, except that we shift our attention to the single rate desired outcome, we nianipulate the utility function so that the desired outcome is achieved. We give a brief introduction to the concepts and terminologies of mechanism design: for a more in-depth treatment of the subject. the readers are referred to [il. [51. Consider a game of 71 nodes. Each node can decide on a suatcgy s, E Si based on their utility function u.i (si, s -i Definition 2: A mechanism is sfrategyproofif for every node i: (1) the strategy space is to declare their types, Si = Oi; and (2) declaring the true type is a dominant strategy, s, ' = 0,.
In essence, a solution to the mechanism design problem should: (1) define the desired outcome of ( .) of the game; and (2) manipulate the utility ui(.) of each node through payment p i ( . ) to achieve the desired outcome. In most mechanism design literature, the utility function is assumed to be quasilinear [ll, [51. [6], [7] . This means that the utility function u i (.I is the sum of the valuation function vi (.) and the payment function p i ( . ) , i.e., u i = vi + pi. We make the simple, but important, distinction between the utility of i (ui) and the valuation of i (vi). The valuation vi is the intrinsic value of a certain system state to node i . This value cannot be altered externally. However, the utility 21.i experienced by node i can be altered by controlling the payment p i .
The celebrated VCG mechanism has been shown to be straregyproof, defined as follows.
Definition 3: A Vickrq-Clarke-Groves (VCG} mechanism is the family of mechanisms M ( 6 ) = (o(O),p(Q)) such that:
Eq. (1) is the VCG outcome function. and it states that the VCG outcome is found by optimizing the total valuation of a network. Q. (2) is the VCG payment function, which can be interpreted intuitively. The first term in the VCG payment function is the total valuation of the system excluding node i ' s valuation, given that the optimal outcome o*(6) is achieved. The second term is similar to the first, except we assume that node i were 60 withdraw front the game when finding lhe oplr'rnal mfcuine oYi (B-i We explore the scenarios of variable and single rate sessions in Fig. 1 . The white nodes in Fig. l(a) represent unfilled buffer nodes. whereas the black nodes in Fig. l(b) represent filled buffer nodes. We will follow this convention in all subsequent figures in this paper. In both figures, node p is receiving data at a rate of 100 KBps from node 7' through a live data session. p will then make three copies of each message, and send it to the three downstream children a, 6, and c respectively. Each node is also labeled with two numbers in square brackets. The number on top represents the incoming throughput limit of i, i.e., L.in,j7 and the bottom number represents the outgoing throughput limit of i, i.e., Lout,i. Iv. THE SCEKARIO OF VARIABLE RATE SESSIONS Before we apply the VCG mechanism to our scenario, we need to first quantify the notion of each node's valuation. In this paper, we capture the valuation vi of each message to each node i intuitively in the form of benefit minus cost. If ICi[ is the number of children of i , and ci is the unit forwarding cost, the valuation is simply the benefit m(bi) minus the total cost (6) IC&:
The values m(bi) and ci are both private information to node i, and are not known to any other node in the overlay network.
However, srrategyproofness of our solution will ensure that each node honestly reports the true value of these information.
A. The VCG Payment
All previous mechanism design literatures that we are aware of have either explicitly or implicitly assumed existence of a trusted third party who is responsible for transferring payments [61, [71, [XI, 191. We have the same assumption here, and adopt the convention that a payment pi > 0 is a payment made from a trusted third party to node i, whereas pi < 0 means that node i must pay the trusted third party. In the context of overlay multicast. the trusted third party is assumed to be the root of We will next derive the correct VCG payment according to Eq. (3) suggests that in order to calculate pi correctly, we need to know the difference between w j and v j i for all j # i. In other words, we need to quantify the net effect of the entrance of i on the rest of the system, i.e., the extemalig of its entrance.
To derive p i , we use Fig. 2 (a) as a visual aid, which depicts the scenario where node i is an internal node with descendants G C i . Again, the white nodes represent unfilled buffer nodes, and the black nodes represent filled buffer nodes. There are three disjoint sets of nodes to consider. namely the parent Pi, the descendants X i , and nodes io other subtrees {Tpi \ Z}.
EQ. (3) can be expanded as follows:
Eq. (3).
(7)
The first term in Eq. (7) simply indicates that the entrance of i costs its parent Pi exactly c.pi to forward each message. The second term in E!q. (7) refers to the descendant of i that has a second-best parent 'PJTz, i.e., an alternate parent other than the optimal parent. In this case, j still needs to forward to the same set of children Cy with the same forwarding cost c j , i.e., cy* = cj and lCj1 = ICJriI. Therefore, the cost component of the valuation function cancels out? and only the difference in benefits (nzjbj) -mjbyi) j is left. The same argument applies for the fourth term as well. On the other hand, the third term in Eq. (7) refers CO the descendant that has no alternate parent.
In this case, j has no way of receiving the multicast data except from i, so when i is not participating, the benefit to j becomes zero, and no forwarding can be done, i.e., nz(byi) = 0, cyi = 0, and lCjl = 0. Therefore, we are left with vj = 2138 m(bj) -ICjlcj. Eq. (8) is our final derived VCG payment equation, and we have renamed the terms to P I , Pz, P3, and P4 respectively for convenience.
B. The VCG Outcome
In the context of our overlay multicast problem, an outcome is the set of independent decisions made by each node to join a parent. More formally, an outcome o = (01: . . . , a,) is a set of choices made by each node i (except the root) on which parent to join such that oi E Ai. Back to our example in Fig. 1 In summary, if a node i can calculate pi, it can simply add its valuation and payment to obtain its utility. Under the strategic node assumption, a node will join to the parent that maximizes U?. It is possible that none of the potential parents of i satisfies the participation constraint. In this case, node i will choose not to subscribe to the multicast service. This is reasonable because strategic nodes have no incentive to subscribe if the utility is not positive.
C. Distribicted Algorithm
Our objective is to design a practical and distributed application-Iayer algorithm that converges to the VCG outcome and VCG payment previously derived. Information regarding a node at one end of the overlay network takes time to propagate through the network to reach the other end. Therefore, there is an unavoidable, but finite, delay in receiving any information from a node who is at the far end of the network. However, as long as the overlay network parameters are slowly varying, i.e., the network dynamics are sufficiently slow, our distributed algorithms should dynamically reconfigw e the multicast topology. In other words, our distributed algorithms should ensure that the optimal multicast tree he formed eveiafually in a finite number of steps. In the following, we wish to find a distributed algorithm that will converge to the correct VCG payment in Eq. (8).
Suppose How to calculale bF3 at node 4? bS3 refers to the best throughput at which node 5 can receive provided that node 3 does not participate. From Fig. 3 , it is clear that there are two alternate paths to consider.
The first path goes through node 9 to reach node 5. The second path goes through node 8 and 4 to reach node 5. By inspection, we observe that the former path will deliver data to node 5 at the throughput of exactly bF4. The second path will deliver data to node 5 at the throughput of bT3, with additional constraints that link 45 may impose, which we call L45 for convenience. L45 is constrained by two factors: (1) the incoming throughput limit at node 5; and ( 2 ) the outgoing throughput limit (according to max-min fair allocation) at node 4, i.e., L4s = nlin(Lfair,4s, Lin,5)
Once L45 is found from EQ. (IO), we take the minimum of bT3 and L45 to obtain the throughput that node .5 will receive at if the path through node 8 and 4 is used to reach 5. Finally, we find the better throughput out of the two paths that we have considered, as follows: Lin.45 is the overall throughput constraint of the path from 4 to 5. and includes three constraints: (1) the incoming throughput limit at node 5: ( 2 ) the outgoing throughput limit (according to max-min fair allocation) at node 4; and (3) the incoming throughput limit at node 4. Comparing Ldj with JJi,,.45. we note that the only additional constraint of ~5i,~,45 is the third constraint. We have:
The second line in Eq. (12) In Fig. 4(a) , consider the scenario where node j is the only child of node i, and node k is the only child of node j . Note that node I i s not a child of node i yet, but suppose node I wishes to calculate the fourth term P4 if if were ro join node i. From our previous.soIution for the second and thud terms, we should have already obtained the data set {bj,bj: ICjl, cj,Li,,jj,bk:b' i, I C k l , c k , L i n , j k ) from the receive-update0 method: For the example in Fig. 4(a) Note that all four throughputs above assume that 1 has not yet joined node i. Now suppose the max-min fair allocation algorithm determines that nodes j or k should each get a throughput of 60 KBps after 1 has joined, then the throughput to node j becomes b: ' = 60 KBps. The superscript +1 is used to distinguish between bj and h:' . While the former represents the throughput of j before 1 joiru i , the latter represents the throughput of j after 1 joins i . The second-best throughput hjTi = 50 KBps is not good enough to motivate node j to leave node i. The change in benefit is thus (ns(ltT') -( b j ) ) = 60 -100, = -40. On the other hand, the throughput to node k after ! has joined becomes b t ' = 70 KBps. This is because the joining of 1 to i has decreased the throughput of node I; to the point that it decides to leave j. The change in throughput is thus (,m(bk) -~( 6 1 , ' ) )
Consider a very similar scenario in Fig. 4(b Now, we need to calculate the change in throughput at node j if node I were to leave node il i.e., b;'. From Fig. 4(b) , we can see that b;l = 100 KBps. Therefore, the change in throughput to node j is (m.(bj) -m(b7')) = 60-100 = -40.
We summarize the fourth-term calculations by an algorithm that will be run on node i when a child or potential child I sends a request for P4. This algorithm, which is also Ofn), is presented in Table In . Lines 7-15 correspond to the scenario in Fig. 4(b) , and lines 16 -24 correspond to Fig. 4(a) 
D. Implemeniaation
To show that our proposed algorithms are practical, we implement the distributed algorithms in iUverlay [ll] , an experimental testbed for implementing and evaluating overlay protocols. The expenments are then deployed on PlanetLab When a node is first started, each node i is bootstrapped with a random set of neighbors, i.e.. A;. These neighbors then become the set of potential parents that a node can join. Recall that each node i must find the best parent to join. In our protocol implementation, this is achieved by passing messages between neighbors or adjacent nodes. Each message In our protocol is identified by its message type. The mechanics of the tree formation and evolution is based on the join and rejoin process. The join process involves the InfoReq-InfoAckJoinReq-JoinAck message sequence. Fig. 5(a) 
141.
P, or rejoin to the new parent U , according to a maximization of its private utility U : , as described in Sec. IV-E. Fig. 5(b We assume that every node is interested in the multicast service. This assumption does not compromise the generality of our experiment because a node who is not interested in a particular multicast service will simply reply with InfoNak whenever it receives an InfoReq, and therefore, will never participate in the formation of the multicast tree anyway.
We define the benefit function and cost to be:
bi in Eq. (14) is the inflow throughput of node i in U p s .
Note that Q. (14) satisfies both the non-negative and nondecreasing criteria of our benefit function. Further, Eq. (15) simulates a higher cost when the number of children increases.
Our experiments involve running 80 PlanetLab nodes distributed over North America in parallel. Fig. 6 presents the geographical distribution of these 80 PlanetLab nodes. The per-node inflow and outflow constraints are emulated by the iOverlay engine [ I l l , and are generated with a power-law distribution over the range specified in Table V Fig. 7(a) further plots the number of KB received by each of the 80 nodes. Each line corresponds to the number of KB received by one node over time. We can see that the experienced data throughputs range from about 5 KBps to 35 KBps. Fig. 7(b) quantifies the percentage gain in terms of per-node throughput of our distributed algorithm (labeled Vunable rare VCG) over a simple benchmark (labeled Vuriuble rate Random). In every rejoin process of the Random scheme, instead of joining to the best neighbor, each node will choose a random neighbor to join to. We observe that each node generally experiences a higher throughput with our VCGbased algorithm than with the Random scheme. We can sum the throughputs of a11 nodes to obtain the total throughput in KBps. Thc total throughputs of the VCG scheme is 1054
KBps, comparing to a total throughput of only 626 KBps -a 68% throughput improvement. This result has confirmed the fact that our distributed protocol is converging to a more optimal multicast tree.
We further evaluate the correctness of our distributed algorithms and protocol implementations in Fig. 7(c) , where we track both the Jyvstem valuation and the system ittilirj over time. Since the VCG outcome from Q. (1) maximizes the system valuation Ci2il, we expect the total valuation of all nodes to monotonically increase over time. Indeed. the solid line in Fig. 7(c) shows that the system valuation rises from an initial value of 0, and converges at approximately 6500, staying at that level for the rest of the experiment. The minor fluctuations is due to delayed or stale information that is inevitable in any distributed protocol. Overall, this result indicates that each node is indeed maximizing the s p e m valuation when making individual decisions based on private utility -a vivid illustration of strategyproofness. In contrast, the system utility demonstrates no observable trend of convergence. T%is observation clarifies a common misconception: when every node in the network maximizes their private utility, the system utility of a VCG-based mechanism is not necessarily maximized.
In Fig. 7(d) . the balance of each node is plotted as a function of time. We have left out the legend of the graph for brevity.
From the figure, most subscribers experience a budget surplus (a positive balance) at the end of the experiment. The solid line is drawn from the perspective of the system as a whole, who experiences an overall deficit. This is an empirical illustration of the well-known budget-balance problem of VCG, which states that the system will run a budget deficit.
We end with an analysis on the overhead of our distributed protocol. As mentioned in our protocol design, a message can either be a control message or a data message. In our experiments, we measure both the data and control messages in KB. and graph the percentage overhead of each node in Fig. 8 . We observe that most nodes experience an overhead of around 0.1 -1%. Furthermore. there are a few nodes who have never joined the multicast tree, since they were unable to find a neighbor who satisfies the participation constraint. Consequently, these nodes have not received any data message, and so they have been left out of Fig. 8 . Overall, the overhead of implementing our protocol in the entire overlay network is a modest O.SS%, as seen from the results summarized in Table   VI . (Fig. 2jb) ): we assume that every node in the network has no more buffer to queue messages. Messages that are received but not sent out to downstream children will immediately be dropped. Another way to interpret a filled buffer node i is that all network links incident at node i will have the same throughput in operation. If all nodes have a filled buffer, then the entire tree will operate at one uniform throughput in steady-state. We introduce the notation b(T,) to represent the uniform operating throughput of the entire subtree 7:. To calculate b(T,), we take the minimum throughput limit of every node in subtree Ti. In other words, Li, or Lo,, of one of the nodes in T i will eventually become the bottkneck that determines the value of b(T'1.
Again, we derive our VCG payment from Eq. (3). Similar to our derivations of payment in the variable rate scenario in Sec. IV-A, we wish to account for the aremalily of the participation of node i. Eq. (17) partitions the set of all nodes (except i) into four disjoint sets, namely the parent of z, the descendants of i who have a second-best parent, the descendants of i who do not have a second-best parent. and the set of all nodes other than those in T,. Note that each term in Eq. (17) corresponds to an effect of the entrance of i . P3 in Eq. (18) merits some furlher discussion. In particular, it suggests that the valuation of nodes in other subtrees will be affected by the entrance of i only when T, throttles the throughput of the existing tree {T, \ Z}. In summary, we have:
B. Tlie VCG Outcome
Similar to the Sec. IV-B, after node i has calculated its payment p ; , it can easily choose the best parent by maximizing to the participation 
C. Distributed Algorithm

W. bnplanenration
Since the structure of the distributed solutions are similar between the single and variable rate scenarios, we will use the same protocol designed in Sec. IV-D in this subsection.
For ease of comparisons, we have kept most experimental parameters the same as before. In the single rate experiments, the buffer size OF each node has been set to one message, instead of 1000 messages. Apparently, this is to emulate the single rate behavior. Further, the single rate distributed algorithms require extra control messages to broadcast the value of b(T;) to all subscribers, and this broadcast message is sent every 2 seconds in the current experiment. for each j f Ci In Pig. 9(ch we plot the system valuation and the system utility as a function of time, where the monotonic increase of system valuation over time can be readily observed, and convergence occurs at around 3000. On the other hand, the system utility displays no observable trend of convergence, as previously explained.
We next turn our attention to the balance of each node over time in Fig. 9(d) . Once again, almost all multicast subscribers gain a positive balance over time, and the system experiences a deficit. These results are quite similar to the variable rate experiments, since both are VCG-based algorithms after all.
In a similar style as our results in the variable rate experiments, Fig. 10 Table X calculates the overhead of our distributed protocol for the single rate scenario to be 1.44%, which is higher than the corresponding overhead of 0.66% for the variable rate scenario. This increase in overhead is contributed by: ( I ) an increase in the number of control messages; and (2) a decrease in the number of data messages. In the single rate scenario, the root has to consistently broadcast the multicast tree throughput b(T,) to every subscriber. These periodic broadcast messages, which are sent every 2 seconds to all subscribers, account for the increase in control messages. In addition, the system as a whole receives only 56635 KB of multicast data in the single rate experiments, in conuast with 103406 KB of multicast data received in the variable rate experiments. Therefore, the whole network is able to receive 83% more multicast data in the variable rate scenario than the single rate scenario -a result that we already argued intuitively at the end of Sec. 111. Fig. 11 graphs the percentage throughput improvement of the variable rate scenario over the single rate scenario. From this figure? it is clear that the nodes in the variable rate scenario generally experience a higher throughput than the nodes in the single rate scenario. In summary. although the message overhead is higher than before, the resulting protocol still runs smoothly in our $0-node experiments.
OveralI, we believe that the results of our implementations on PlanetLab have verified some of the important properties of our VCG-based distributed protocol. Our protocol has also been evaluated in terms of its convergence to oprimality, Feigenbaum ef al. [9] applied mechanism design to solve the ZP multicast problem in a distributed manner, but with a greater inclination towards theoretical complexity issues. In contrast, we have a more concrete network model and a more realistic problem formulation involving single and variable rate sessions. At the same time, we successfully designed distributed algorithms in each scenario that converge to the VCG solution. Sufficient detail of our distributed algorithms have also been provided that allows a direct implementation on PlanetLab, comparing to the more abstract and theoretical treatment from [9] . Overall. the extensive implementation results presented here have justified the validity of our protocol and mechanism design, which, to our knowledge. has not been accomplished before.
Woodard et al. [14] also uses the VCG mechanism to set up the problem of network formation, but with little attention given to formulating a reasonable valuation function for a specific scenario. Furthermore, the paper has made no attempt in solving the VCG mechanism in a distributed manner and has nor performed any simulations or implementation.
Nonetheless, their work provides an interesting perspective of dynamic and seqvential mechanisms, which will serve as a good complement to our current work.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have solved for a strafegyproof mechanism for overlay multicast tree formation in both the variable and single rate scenarios. Distributed algorithms have been presented and shown to converge to the global network optimal of maximum system throughput and minimum message forwarding costs. In both solutions, participation of each node is voluntary, so that a node may leave the multicasl tree whenever its private utility becomes negative. Thus, every node is entitled to a non-negative utility. and the right amount of incentives will be given to reveal truthful private information. More importantly, not only have we found distributed algorithms to converge towards the VCG solution, but we have also carefully designed a protocol verified by actual implementation in PlanetLah. In summary, we believe that we have narrowed the pap between theory and practice. and have brought the research community one step closer to the actual deployment and realization of these VCG-based strategyproof mechanisms.
